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Abstract
In the 60’s Shapley provided an example of a two player fictitious game with periodic
behaviour. In this game, player A aims to copy B’s behaviour and player B aims to play
one ahead of player A. In this paper we generalize Shapley’s example by introducing an
external parameter. We show that the periodic behaviour in Shapley’s example at some
critical parameter value disintegrates into unpredictable (chaotic) behaviour, with players
dithering a huge number of times between different strategies. At a further critical param-
eter the dynamics becomes periodic again, but now both players aim to play one ahead
of the other. In this paper we adopt a geometric (dynamical systems) approach and show
that GENERICALLY the dynamics of fictitious play is essentially continuous and uniquely
defined everywhere except at the interior equilibrium. Here we concentrate on the periodic
behaviour, while in the sequel to this paper we shall describe the chaotic behaviour.
1 Introduction
Suppose that a two-player finite game in normal form is repeated infinitely often. Suppose further
that, at each stage of the repeated game, each player plays a best response to the empirical
distribution of the past play of her opponent. Then the state of the repeated game at any given
stage can be summarized by the pair consisting of the empirical distribution of past actions
of player A and the empirical distribution of past actions of player B, and this state evolves
according to a dynamical system. This dynamical system is known as fictitious play.
Fictitious play arises in many different guises in economics. It was originally proposed as an
algorithm for finding equilibrium, see Brown (1949), Brown (1951a) and Brown (1951b). It was
later reinterpreted as a model of boundedly rational learning in interactive settings, see Chapter
2 of Fudenberg & Levine (1998) and the references cited there. Several modifications have been
introduced, including: (i) a modification in which players do not play exact best responses but
instead choose actions with a probability that increases with their payoffs, see Cowan (1992) and
Fudenberg & Levine (1995); (ii) a modification in which each player is replaced by a population
of players whose payoffs differ by a small random perturbations, see Ellison & Fudenberg (2000);
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and (iii) a modification in which players play exact best responses with some probability and
experiment at random with some probability, see Fudenberg & Levine (1998) and the references
cited there. Finally, there is a discrete-time version, in which the underlying normal-form game
is played for each t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}, and a continuous-time version, in which the underlying normal-
form game is played for each t ∈ [0,+∞).
Much effort has been devoted to finding sufficient conditions under which fictitious play
converges to an equilibrium from all starting points. For example, fictitious play has been shown
to converge in: (i) zero-sum games, see Robinson (1951), Hofbauer (1995) and Harris (1998);
(ii) generic 2 × n nonzero-sum games (see Miyasawa (1961) and Metrick & Polak (1994) for the
2× 2 case; Sela (2000) for the 2× 3 case; and Berger (2005) for the general case); (iii) potential
games (see Monderer & Shapley (1996) for the case of weighted potential games and Berger
(2007) for the case of ordinal potential games); (iv) dominance-solvable games (see Milgrom &
Roberts (1991)) and (v) various classes of supermodular games (see: Krishna (1992) for the case
of supermodular games with diminishing returns; Hahn (1999) for the case of 3×3 supermodular
games; and Berger (2007) for the case of quasi-supermodular games with diminishing returns,
the case of quasi-supermodular 3× n games and the case of quasi-supermodular 4× 4 games).
Some effort has also been devoted to understanding fictitious play in games in which fictitious
play does not necessarily converge to an equilibrium. One approach is by way of examples. The
first contribution to this strand of the literature was made by Shapley (1964), who identified a
generic 3 × 3 nonzero-sum game for which fictitious play has a stable limit cycle. Three more
recent contributions are: Jordan (1993), who constructed a 2 × 2 × 2 game for which fictitious
play has a stable limit cycle; Gaunersdorfer & Hofbauer (1995), who established an interesting
relationship between the replicator dynamics and fictitious play in three examples in which
fictitious play converges to a limit cycle (namely Shapley’s example, Jordan’s example and the
rock-scissors-paper game); and Cowan (1992), who identified a difficult numerical example in
which fictitious play exhibits chaotic behaviour (in the sense that the flow contains a subshift of
finite type). Our work is closest in spirit to Berger (1995).1
Another approach is taken by Krishna & Sjo¨stro¨m (1998), building on earlier work of Rosenmu¨ller
(1971). In this interesting paper, they show that generically (i.e. for Lebesgue almost all pay-off
matrices), fictitious play cannot converge cyclically to a mixed strategy equilibrium if both players
use more than two pure strategies. In other words, if fictitious play converges to a mixed strategy
equilibrium with both players using more than two strategies then the choice of strategies cannot
follow a cyclic pattern.2
The purpose of this and a sequel to this paper is a detailed analysis of the following family
of 3× 3 games with utilities vA and vB determined by the matrices
A =

 1 0 ββ 1 0
0 β 1

 B =

 −β 1 00 −β 1
1 0 −β

 , (1.1)
1We would like to thank the referee for bringing this unpublished work to our attention. Berger considers a
family of symmetric bimatrix games depending on a parameter k such that (i) for k ∈ (−2, 0) has a Shapley orbit
which degenerates as k → 0, and (ii) for k > 0, as in our case, there exists a hexagonal orbit along which both
players are indifferent between (at least) 2 strategies. Berger observes similar ’chaotic’ numerical phenomena as
in Subsection 3.5 of our paper, and also shows the existence of an additional periodic orbit of saddle-type.
2For their result Krishna and Sjo¨stro¨m only (need to) consider the situation where at any given moment only
one of the players is in indifferent. As becomes clear from our paper (and its sequel), it is precisely near the set
where both players are simultaneously indifferent that much of the interesting behaviour happens (and this set
’organises’ the local dynamics).
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which depend on a parameter β ∈ (−1, 1) (and best response dynamics given by the differential
inclusion (2.2)). We will show that for some parameters β play becomes cyclic and for others it
becomes erratic.
For β = 0, this game is equal to Shapley’s: irrespective of the starting position, every orbit
tends to a periodic motion, with eventually player A copying the previous move of player B,
while player B is aiming to play one ahead from the previous move of player A. Plotting the
index of the largest component of the utilities vA and vB (“the strategy” of player A resp. B)
as a function of time we obtain the repeating pattern (repeating in 6 steps):
time duration 0.33123 0.31767 0.33123 0.31767 0.33123 0.31767
strategy player A 1 2 2 3 3 1
strategy player B 2 2 3 3 1 1
That is, during 0.33123 time units players A,B prefer strategies 1, 2 respectively, then for 0.31767
time units they prefer 2, 2 and so on.
For β = σ := (
√
5 − 1)/2 ≈ 0.618 (ignoring usual convention we shall call this number3
the golden mean), the game is equivalent to a zero-sum game4: rescaling B to B˜ = σ(B − 1)
gives A + B˜ = 0. So all orbits tend to the equilibrium E = (EA, EB) with EA = (AB)T =
(1/3, 1/3, 1/3). However, the players will not choose strategies cyclically (this follows of course
from Krishna & Sjo¨stro¨m (1998)): one gets sequences such as
strategy player A 1223331122332112211223322333223311221132233223332233111223311
strategy player B 2233211223311122332233223321133112233222332233211331132233112
Indeed, as will be shown in Sparrow & van Strien (2006), the convergence happens in a chaotic
fashion and can be projected into one which is ’area preserving’.
For β ≈ 1 the players’ game also tends to a periodic pattern, but now both player A and B
aim to play one ahead from the other player, and therefore now infinitely often repeat (again
repeating in 6 steps):
time duration 0.12060 0.39493 0.12060 0.39493 0.12060 0.39492
strategy player A 1 1 3 3 2 2
strategy player B 3 2 2 1 1 3
We call this the anti-Shapley pattern. The main point of this paper is to show how this change of
behaviour occurs. It turns out that there are two critical parameters, σ the golden mean ≈ 0.618
and τ ≈ 0.915 such that
• for β ∈ (−1, σ) the players typically end up repeating Shapley’s pattern; in fact, for β ∈
(−1, 0] regardless of the initial positions, the behaviour tends to a periodic one (for β > 0
this is not true: then there are orbits which tend to the interior equilibrium and/or other
periodic orbits).
• for β ∈ (σ, τ) the players become extremely indecisive and erratic (and the moves become
chaotic), while
3σ is the smaller of the two roots of σ2 + σ − 1 = 0.
4We would like to thank the referee for pointing this out.
3
• for β ∈ (τ, 1) the players typically end up playing the anti-Shapley pattern.
For example, when β = 0.75 one sees erratic behaviour such as
strat. A 331122233112211322333223322133113331133113311331133211221122
strat. B 211221331122332223321133113331133211221122112211221112211221
In this paper we shall describe the bifurcations that the periodic orbits undergo as β varies; in
a sequel to this paper (Sparrow & van Strien (2006)), the nature of the chaotic motion will be
described in more detail (for example, that even for β ∈ (0, σ), there are many (exceptional)
orbits that are attracted to the equilibrium point).
Of course, when one or more of the players is indifferent between two strategies their dynamics
is not uniquely determined. However, as we shall show in Corollary 2.1 (in Subsection 2.1) under
a mild assumption only exceptional orbits of the play are affected by this ambiguity. In particular,
the orbits discussed above are uniquely determined.
2 Continuous Time Fictitious Play: the Generic Case
We study the following version of continuous time fictitious play, which is convenient for calcu-
lation, for numerical simulation, and for extracting the geometrical properties of the dynamics.
It is equivalent to other formulations in the literature. Two players A and B, both having n
strategies to choose from, have n × n pay-off matrices A = (aij) and B = (bij), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
respectively. (The context will always make it clear whether we are talking about Players A or
B or about the matrices A and B). We will assume throughout this paper that the matrices A
and B are both non-singular (i.e. have non-zero determinant). We denote the set of probability
vectors for players A and B by ΣA, ΣB ⊂ Rn. (Though both simplices are the same subset
of Rn, the subscripts are useful when we wish to make it clear which players probabilities we
are discussing). At some time t0 ∈ R the state of the game is given by a pair of probability
vectors, (pA(t0), p
B(t0)) ∈ Σ := ΣA×ΣB, representing the current (usually mixed) strategies of
the two players. It is convenient to define pA and pB so that they are row and column vectors
respectively.
The dynamics of the system is determined as follows. At time t0, each player computes a best
response BRA(p
B) ∈ ΣA and BRB(pA) ∈ ΣB to the other player’s current strategy. If we denote
the set of pure strategies for the two players by PAi ∈ ΣA and PBj ∈ ΣB, 1 ≤ i, j,≤ n, then
generically 5 player A’s best response BRA is a pure strategy P
A
i ∈ ΣA, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
chosen so that the i-th coordinate of the vector
vA(t0) = Ap
B(t0)
is larger than the other coordinates (the non-generic case, when several coordinates of the vector
vA(t0) are equal will be treated later on). Similarly, player B’s best response BRB is generically
a pure strategy PBj ∈ ΣB, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} where j is chosen so that the j-th coordinate of the
vector
vB(t0) = p
A(t0)B
5In this paper the word ‘generic’ means that one is not in a codimension-one subspace
4
is larger than any of the other coordinates. In cases where players are indifferent between two or
more strategies (the non-generic case), any convex combination of the relevant pure strategies is
an equally good best response, so
BRA : ΣB → ΣA and BRB : ΣA → ΣB
are in fact set-valued maps. This means equation (2.2) below actually defines a differential
inclusion rather than a differential equation. 6
Once best responses are selected, the dynamics is determined by the piecewise linear equa-
tions:
dpA/dt = BRA(p
B)− pA
dpB/dt = BRB(p
A)− pB (2.2)
so that each player’s tendency is to adjust their strategy in a straight line from their current
strategy towards their current best response.7 In the GENERIC case as discussed above, player
A continuously adjusts her probability vector pA(t) from its current position pA(t0) in a straight
line towards PAi , and player B similarly adjusts p
B(t) to move in a straight line towards PBj ,
so that for times greater than t0, and for so long as strategies P
A
i and P
B
j remain unique best
responses, we may write, after a reparameterisation of time, the solution of (2.2) becomes
pA(t0 + s) = p
A(t0)(1− s) + s · PAi ,
pB(t0 + s) = p
B(t0)(1− s) + s · PBj , (2.3)
for s ∈ [0, 1]. Note that we have parameterised time so that both players move towards their
best response strategies at a uniform speed, such that if their best responses did not change they
would arrive at (PAi , P
B
j ) ∈ ∂Σ at time t = t0 + 1, at which point the dynamics would halt.
The parameterisation is chosen for ease of calculation and computation, and does not affect the
geometry of the dynamics which is our chief concern in this paper; it would be straightforward to
use the original time ̺ = − ln(1−s) if an exponential approach to (PAi , PBj ) in infinite time were
preferred (the speed of a solution of (2.2) is proportional to the distance to the target point). In
any case, since orbits consist of pieces of line segments, numerical simulations can be done easily
and with arbitrary accuracy.
Equations (2.3) therefore determine the dynamics up until such time as one or other (or both)
players become indifferent between two (or more) pure strategies.
Let us first describe the sets where the best responses are constant. We will be particularly
interested in games where there is an interior equilibrium; that is a point E = (EA, EB) in
the interior of ΣA × ΣB where both players are indifferent between all n strategies, so that all
components of AEB are equal, and all components of EAB are equal. The following lemma is
entirely straightforward.
6We will deal with this apparent complication in sections 2.1 and 2.2 below. Our approach will be to consider
the flow where best responses are uniquely defined and to investigate the extent to which this flow extends in a
unique and continuous way onto the parts of phase space where best responses are not unique; for the moment
readers unfamiliar with the idea of differential inclusion will lose very little by continuing to think of (2.2) as a
differential equation.
7The best response correspondences pB 7→ BRA(p
B) and pA 7→ BRB(p
A) are upper semicontinous with values
closed, convex sets. It follows from Aubin & Cellina (1984, Chapter 2.1) that through each initial value there
exists at least one solution which is Lipschitz continuous and defined for all positive time. In a sequel to this
paper we will show that, under mild regularity conditions, any solution is in fact piecewise linear.
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Lemma 2.1 (The complement of the indifferent sets). Assume that A and B are n × n non-
singular matrices. Then the set where one player is indifferent between two given strategies (and
so where she has a choice of best responses) forms a codimension-one hyperplane and for each
1 ≤ i, j ≤ n the set
Sij = {(pA, pB) ; BRA(pB) = PAi and BRB(pA) = PBj }
is convex.
If there exists an equilibrium E = (EA, EB) in the interior of Σ, then all n2 regions Sij are
non-empty, and their closures meet at (EA, EB).
Figure 1 shows a 3×3 example in which the two simplices ΣA and ΣB are each two dimensional
triangles, with vertices representing the pure strategies of the two players as labelled, and the
regions Sij with different aims marked in the figure. The state of the system at a particular
time, (pA(t), pB(t)) is represented by a pair of points, pA and pB, one in each simplex. The local
direction of motion is towards the vertex determined by the location of the other players position
in her simplex, as illustrated. Motion will continue in a straight line until one or other player
hits an indifference line (see caption).
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Figure 1: An example in which the simplices ΣA and ΣB the regions where players have a specific
preference are as shown, separated by dashed lines which show the indifference sets ZB ⊂ ΣA where
player B is indifferent between two or more strategies, and ZA ⊂ ΣB where player A is indifferent between
two or more strategies. Starting from an initial condition (pA, pB) (marked with the * symbols), player
A moves towards PA3 , while Player B starts by moving towards P
B
3 and changes direction towards P
B
1
as pA crosses ZB . The sets Sij ∈ R
4 are the sets formed as products of two kite-shaped regions where
each player has a strict preference.
2.1 Uniqueness and continuity of dynamics where at most one player
is indifferent
We now consider, for general matrices A and B, the hyperplanes where one or other player is
indifferent between two strategies.
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Let us denote the set where player A is indifferent between strategies PAi and P
A
j by Z
A
i,j ⊂ ΣB.
We define ZBi,j ⊂ ΣA similarly. If we set ZA = ∪i,jZAi,j , then ΣA × ZA is the set where player A
does not have a unique best response. We define the set ZB similarly. Outside the set
Z =
(
ΣA × ZA
)⋃(
ZB × ΣB
)
where at least one of the players is indifferent between two or more strategies the flow is uniquely
defined by (2.2) and is clearly continuous. If we define
Z∗ = ZB × ZA ⊂ ΣA × ΣB , (2.4)
which is the subset of Z where both players are indifferent between at least two strategies, then
the next lemma says that the uniqueness and continuity extends to the complement of Z∗ pro-
vided matrices A and B satisfy the condition (2.5) in the lemma. (Note that this transversality
condition is satisfied for the Shapley example from above if and only if β 6= 0.)
Proposition 2.1 (Transversality condition implies local continuity and uniqueness outside the
set where both players are indifferent). The motion defined by equations (2.2) forms a continuous
flow on (ΣA × ΣB) \ Z∗ provided the following condition is met: for any point (pA, pB) /∈ Z∗
with, say, pA ∈ ZB, pB /∈ ZA and strategy PAk preferable for player A,
the vector PAk is not parallel to the plane Z
B ⊂ ΣA at pA (2.5)
(and similarly, in the case when the role of pA and pB is reversed). 8
Proof. The transversality condition (2.5) ensures that a point is moved immediately off the
codimension-one plane ZB × ΣB so that player B has a unique best response the moment the
motion begins.
Since Z∗ has zero Lebesgue measure and consists of codimension two planes, this shows
Corollary 2.1. Assume the tranversality condition (2.5) holds. Then there exists a set X ⊂
ΣA × ΣB of initial conditions such that
• for each starting point in X the flow defined by (2.2) is continuous and unique for all t ≥ 0.
• X has full Lebesgue measure and is open and dense.
2.2 Local dynamics where both players are indifferent: outside sets of
codimension three
Even though the previous corollary shows that most starting positions never enter the set Z∗
where both players are indifferent, it is still important to analyse the dynamics near this set. As
8The linear space of vectors where the l and l′-th options are indifferent to player B consists of the vectors in
R
m which are orthogonal to the difference of the l-th and l′-th column vector of the matrix B. That the k-unit
unit vector in Rm is not contained in this, means therefore that bkl 6= bkl′ . So the above transversality condition
holds if within each column vector of A, the coefficients are all distinct (i.e. aij 6= ai′j when i 6= i
′), and similarly
bkl 6= bkl′ when l 6= l
′. Clearly the set of matrices for which this holds is open and dense (and of full Lebesgue
measure).
7
it turns out, in many places the flow outside Z∗ extends continuously to Z∗. This suggests a
natural choice of the non-uniquely defined dynamics within Z∗. Much more importantly - even if
we are not interested in orbits that lie on Z∗ and do not want to make a choice for the dynamics
on this set - the continuous extension dynamics on Z∗ is an “organising principle” for nearby
orbits, as we shall see below. This continuous extension dynamics makes that all orbits near Z∗
have consistent dynamics. This point of view puts us in a classical dynamical systems framework
and allows us, for example, to describe bifurcations of the flow (i.e. changes in dynamics when
the parameter β changes) for orbits near Z∗ (as we shall see in the Section 3).
Before going into the general case in the next subsection, let us consider the codimension-two
case. To do this, let us first review the dynamics in the 2× 2 case (this of course is well known,
but it is useful to be explicit here as we shall use the classification later on). In this case the
probability simplices ΣA and ΣB in R
2 can both be identified with [0, 1] and so ΣA × ΣB with
the square [0, 1]× [0, 1]. Player A moves left or right, depending on the position pB of player B,
i.e. depending whether (pA, pB) is above or below a certain horizontal line, and similarly player
B moves up or down depending on whether (pA, pB) is to the left or right of some vertical line.
Drawn in Figure 2 are a few orbits of the system in various cases and • marks the aims (0, 0),
(1, 0), (0, 1) and (1, 1). The dotted lines denote where one player in indifferent to two strategies.
From left to right cases (1), (2), (3), (2) and (3). In cases (2) the orbit spirals towards the interior
point, while in case (3) the interior point acts as a saddle.9
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Figure 2: The motion in various cases for 2× 2 games.
Lemma 2.2 (2×2 case). Assume that both players have two strategies and that the corresponding
2× 2 matrices are non-singular. Then there are three possibilities:
1. there is no interior equilibrium in ΣA×ΣB and all orbits tend to a unique singular point on
the boundary (this occurs if ZA and or ZB are empty, and is depicted in (1) in Figure 2);
2. there is an interior equilibrium E which is stable, orbits spiral towards it and the flow
extends continuously to E (this is depicted in (2) in Figure 2);
3. there is an interior equilibrium E which is a saddle point and the flow cannot be extended
in a continuous way to E and there is genuine non-uniqueness in the flow near E (this is
depicted in (3) in Figure 2).
9In case (3), the orbit through a point in the stable manifold enters the equilibrium point in finite time!
Moreover, through the interior equilibrium point E there are an uncountable set of solutions; one of these remains
in E for all time (at least locally), and the others stay in E for some (possibly small) finite time which can be
chosen freely, and then fall off in the unstable direction.
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As we shall see in the next section, in case (2) the solution tends to E as t → ∞, spiralling
faster and faster around E in a very precise way.10 This means that we can think of the flow at
E as just stationary there; the flow is continuous (and each solution is unique).
We now consider the behaviour of the system when both players are indifferent between two
or more strategies (but now for general A and B). This occurs on the set Z∗ = ZB ×ZA defined
above. Since we are interested in typical trajectories of the system, and typical trajectories will
not actually hit Z∗, we are particularly concerned with the implications of this for trajectories
near to but not on Z∗. This contrasts with the case of the codimension one sets considered above;
typical trajectories do hit those. We will see, though, that we can in many circumstances define
a unique flow for points in Z∗ as well.
Consider the subset Z ′kl,ij of Z
B
k,l×ZAi,j ⊂ Z∗ where player A is indifferent only between strate-
gies i and j, and player B is indifferent only between strategies k and l. Since we assumed that
A and B are non-singular, this is a codimension-two plane in ΣA ×ΣB. Define a neighbourhood
of Z ′kl,ij by
N =
{
(pA, pB) ; BRA(p
B) ⊂ {i, j} and BRB(pA) ⊂ {k, l}
}
. (2.6)
In the set N , player A prefers strategies i and j to all other pure strategies, and player B
prefers strategies k and l. In N \ Z ′, because of Proposition 2.1 above, equation (2.2) can be
justifiably interpreted as a differential equation with unique solutions (rather than a differential
inclusion with possibly non-unique solutions) with the dynamics consisting of a linear decline in
all components pAm,m 6= i, j and pBn , n 6= k, l while the behaviour of the other two components of
pA and pB depends entirely on the 2× 2 submatrices of A and B:
A[k, l] =
(
ak,k ak,l
al,k al,l
)
B[i, j] =
(
bi,i bi,j
bj,i bj,j
)
.
These matrices describe a game on the two-dimensional space spanned by [PAi , P
B
j ]× [PBk , PBl ]
(where [PAi , P
A
j ] stands for the line segment λP
A
i +(1−λ)PAj ⊂ ΣA, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1). It follows11 that
the dynamics in N is the product of the dynamics in this two-dimensional space (on which the
dynamics is as in Figure 2) and a linear decline along the codimension-two plane in Z ′. Together
with Lemma 2.1 this gives:
Proposition 2.2 (Continuity and uniqueness outside sets of codimension three). Assume that A
and B have maximal rank and that the transversality condition (2.5) is satisfied. Then the flow
defined on the sets Sij has a unique continuous extension everywhere except (possibly) where:
• one player is indifferent to at least three strategies and the other to at least two;
• both players are indifferent to precisely two strategies and along this set the dynamics is as
in case (3) described above (in Lemma 2.2).
In the neighbourhood N of Z ′kl,ij defined in (2.6) the flow decomposes into a flow governed by a
two by two game, and a constant flow in the remaining direction(s) and there are three cases:
10In this case the orbit through any point outside the equilibrium never hits the equilibrium point.
11A similar decomposition is also used in Hofbauer (1995, page 6 and Appendix A). Amongst other things,
Hofbauer shows in this interesting paper that the dynamics starting at a point x ∈ ΣA × ΣB can proceed in a
straight line in the direction b ∈ ΣA ×ΣB iff b is a Nash equilibrium of the restricted game at x. Here we use the
same approach to investigate uniqueness. In a sequel to this paper, we will push this point of view further.
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1. trajectories cross either ZBk,l or Z
A
i,j and locally the flow is the product of a constant flow
perpendicular to the plane and a flow as in (1) in Figure 2;
2. trajectories in N spiral towards E (i.e. towards Z ′) along a cone over a quadrangle as in
Figure 3, and move closer and closer to the unique trajectory in Z ′ that remains in Z ′ –
this trajectory is therefore the unique continuous extension of the flow in N onto Z ′ - and
locally the two-dimensional flow is as in (2) in Figure 2;
3. Z ′ acts as a saddle and generic trajectories leave N moving away from Z ′ in one of two
opposite directions and locally the two-dimensional flow is as in (3) in Figure 2.
Proof. Only the 2nd case needs some explanation. Let S be the two dimensional plane spanned
by the four targets (PAs , P
B
t ), s ∈ {i, j} and t ∈ {k, l}. Moreover let V ⊂ S be a quadrangle with
sides parallel to the lines connecting the equilibrium E ∈ S to (PAs , PBt ), s ∈ {i, j} and t ∈ {k, l}
(in such a way that in the region where the players aim for (PAs , P
B
t ) one takes a line parallel to
the line connecting ) to (PAs , P
B
t )). Now taking any quadrangle Vr parallel to V , and the cone
through the equilibrium E ∈ S over Vr. Clearly orbits that start in this cone, will stay in it.
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Z’
Figure 3: The targets (PAs , P
B
t ), s ∈ {i, j}, t ∈ {k, l} in the plane S are drawn marked as •. The dashed
line corresponds to Z′. A quadrangle Tr in S is also drawn and also another quadrangle T
′
r which is
in a plane Sq (through q ∈ Z
′) which is parallel to S is drawn. The cone of the quadrangle over the
equilibrium point E is invariant. Orbits spiral along the cone towards E, always aiming for one of the
points marked as •. Note that the motion on the cone is not close to the direction of the axis Z′.
In case (1) though both players have a choice of best response at (pA, pB), there is no choice
of best responses that keeps the trajectory inside Z∗. This transversality ensures that the de-
generacy occurs only at discrete times (i.e., ‘momentarily’ if we may put it like that), and there
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is actually only one solution to the differential inclusion through (pA, pB). In case (2) there is
a unique choice of best responses on Z∗ for both players such that the flow defined by equation
(2.2) remains within Z∗. Nearby solutions remain close to and spiral (locally) towards this so-
lution, and so it is the continuous extension of the (unique) flow off Z∗. Again, the apparent
non-uniqueness is an artefact; we may say if we like that any attempt to depart from this solution
in Z∗ is immediately thwarted by the neighbouring flow. Only in case (3) do we find genuine
non-uniqueness of solutions to the differential inclusion. This amounts to the fact that there is a
choice of best response for each player which keeps the flow within Z∗, and all other choices move
you immediately off Z∗ in one of two directions. Thus through (pA, pB) there are an uncountable
set of solutions; one of these remains in Z∗ for all time (at least locally), and the others stay in
Z∗ for some (small) finite time which can be chosen freely, and then fall off in one of the two
directions (again chosen freely).
3 Existence and stability of periodic orbits in the Shapley
family
From now we shall concentrate on a particular family example which includes a classical example
by Shapley. These examples are given by matrices
A =

 1 0 ββ 1 0
0 β 1

 B =

 −β 1 00 −β 1
1 0 −β

 , (3.7)
When β = 0, this means that the utility of player A is equal to pB, so player A’s will aim
for the largest component of pB, while player B utility is (pA3 , p
A
2 , p
A
1 ) = p
AB so B is aiming
one ahead from the largest component of pA. So for β = 0, it is like the paper, scissor, rock
game. Our interest is to understand how the behaviour in this game changes when β changes. In
Subsection 3.5 we show that the player’s actions will become extremely erratic for certain values
of β.
Figure 4 shows pictures of the phase space in the cases −1 < β < 0 and 0 < β < 1, marking
the lines where the players are indifferent by dashed lines. (In Figure 1 the phase space was
drawn for β = 0.) Note that for all values of β both players are indifferent between all three
strategies at the point E = (EA, EB) where EA = (EB)T = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). Note that when
β 6= 0, for each pA ∈ ZBij ⊂ ΣA, each aim vector pAPAk is transversal to ZBij , and similarly for
pB ∈ ZAij ⊂ ΣB. So the transversality condition of 2.5 holds for β 6= 0.
3.1 Continuity and uniqueness of the flow
We now apply the results of the previous section to the family of examples defined by matrices
(3.7). An essential difference between the cases β < 0 and β > 0 can be understood in terms of
that analysis.
Proposition 3.1 (Continuity and uniqueness). When β ∈ (0, 1) the unique flow on the comple-
ment of the indifference set Z extends to a flow on Z which is everywhere continuous and unique
except at E = (EA, EB). When β ∈ (−1, 0], the unique flow on the complement of Z does not
extend continuously to some codimension two surfaces in Z∗. In more detail:
11
...........................................................................................................................
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
.............................................................................................................
..
..
..
.
...
..
..
..
.
.....
.......
.......
.......
.....
.......
.......
.......
∗
∗
∗
PA1
PA2
PA3
→ PB2
→ PB1
→ PB3
β < 0
...........................................................................................................................
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
.............................................................................................................
..
..
..
.
...
..
..
..
.
.....
.......
.......
.......
......
.......
.......
.......
•
•
•
PB1
PB2
PB3
→ PA1
→ PA3
→ PA2
β > 0
...........................................................................................................................
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
.............................................................................................................
..
...
..
..
...
..
..
.
......
.......
.......
.......
......
.......
.......
.......
∗
∗
∗
PA1
PA2
PA3
→ PB2
→ PB1
→ PB3
...........................................................................................................................
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
.............................................................................................................
..
...
..
..
...
..
..
.
.....
.......
.......
.......
.....
.......
.......
.......
•
•
•
PB1
PB2
PB3
→ PA1
→ PA3
→ PA2
Figure 4: The simplices ΣA and ΣB for β < 0 (above) and β > 0 (below). For β ∈ [−1, 1], the sets where
Player A is indifferent between two strategies are line segments ZAij in ΣB connecting the equilibrium
point EA = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) to the points 1
(2−β)
(1, 1−β, 0) 1
(2−β)
(1−β, 0, 1) and 1
(2−β)
(0, 1, 1−β) (marked
with •). Player B is indifferent between two strategies along line segments ZBi,j in ΣA connecting the
midpoint (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) to the points 1
(2+β)
(1+ β, 1, 0), 1
(2+β)
(1, 0, 1+ β) and 1
(2+β)
(0, 1+ β, 1) (marked
with ∗). For β = 0 these points lie on the middle of the sides of the triangles ∂ΣA and ∂ΣB (as in Figure
1). Increasing β ∈ [−1, 1] rotates the lines anticlockwise (so the end point moves for example from PB2
towards PB1 ). Note that these indifference lines in the simplices ΣA and ΣB do not coincide (despite the
appearance of the figure); for example, when β = 1 then in ΣB the indifference lines Z
A
i,j go through the
corners, but the lines ZBi,j in ΣA do not.
• If β ∈ (−1, 0) then the transversality condition from Proposition 2.1 holds for all codimen-
sion one indifference points in Z. All the codimension two points in Z∗ are in cases (1)
or (3), and the flow off Z extends continuously to those points that are in case (1). The
differential inclusion (2.2) defines a flow that is unique except at those points, where the
flow is discontinuous.
• If β = 0 then the transversality condition from Proposition 2.1 fails to hold in several
codimension-one sets (for example, the set ZB1,2 × {z ∈ ΣB ; BRA(pB) = PA1 }).
• If β ∈ (0, 1) then the transversality condition from Proposition 2.1 holds on all codimension
one indifference sets, and all the codimension two points in Z∗ are in case (1) or (2). In
particular, the flow off Z extends continuously to all points except E = (EA, EB), and so
the differential inclusion (2.2) defines a unique and continuous flow everywhere except at
12
the interior equilibrium E.
Proof. This can be seen just by looking at the possible 2 × 2 games that can be obtained from
submatrices of A and B and applying the results from the previous section. (It is also possible
to convince oneself of the result graphically by comparing the disposition of lines Z
A/B
i,j and
points PAi and P
B
j in Figure 1 and 4.) When β < 0 case (3) holds, for example, in Z
B
12 × ZA2,3.
When β > 0 there are points in Z∗, for example on the set ZB1,2 × ZA1,2 where case (2) arises and
trajectories locally spiral around and tend towards Z∗ (until they meet another set in Z∗). On
the other hand orbits cross ZB1,2 × ZA2,3 (which is in case (1) transversally when β > 0.
We will see later that when β > 0 there is genuine non-uniqueness of the flow at E. The
spiralling behaviour that can occur near Z∗ for β > 0 contributes significantly to the extra
richness of behaviour in β > 0. The subset J ⊂ Z∗ 12 on which we have this behaviour consists
of the six pieces of Z∗:
J = (ZB1,2 × ZA3,1) ∪ (ZB1,2 × ZA1,2)
⋃
(ZB2,3 × ZA1,2) ∪ (ZB1,2 × ZA2,3)
⋃
⋃
(ZB3,1 × ZA2,3) ∪ (ZB2,3 × ZA3,1) (3.8)
The set consisting of the remaining three pieces of Z∗:
T = (ZB1,2 × ZA2,3)
⋃
(ZB2,3 × ZA3,1)
⋃
(ZB3,1 × ZA1,2) (3.9)
contains the codimension two points where the flow is transversal (case (1)).
3.2 Existence and stability of a clockwise Shapley periodic orbit for
β ∈ (−1, σ)
Let σ be the golden mean. We shall first show the existence of a stable periodic orbit for
β ∈ (−1, σ). We call this the Shapley orbit, as it is the continuation of the orbit described by
Shapley (1964) for the case β = 0, or the clockwise orbit, as the projections of the orbit into
the spaces ΣA and ΣB rotate clockwise about the equilibrium, see the figure below. In the next
subsection we shall also show that this orbit is globally attracting when β ≤ 0. For β = 0 orbits
spiral away from the equilibrium points towards a periodic orbit (which consists in 4 dimensional
phase space ΣA × Σb of 6 pieces of straight lines).
β = 0
ΣA simplex ΣB simplex
12We could take J to stand for ”jitter”, since as nearby trajectories spiral around J , both players jitter back
and forth between strategies.
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The figure below shows the utility n = ApB of player A as a function of time for β = 0. The
players move away (in an oscillatory fashion) from the equilibrium point and tend to a periodic
motion. Note that where two graphs meet, the players are indifferent between two strategies.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6 β = 0
50number of switches=
time
n1
n2
n3
Theorem 3.1 (Existence of the Shapley periodic orbit). For β ∈ (−1, σ) there exists a periodic
orbit in which player 1 and 2 infinitely repeat the strategies
time 1 2 3 4 5 6
strategy player A 1 2 2 3 3 1
strategy player B 2 2 3 3 1 1
(So player A copies B and player B tries to play one ahead of A.) This is a continuous defor-
mation of the orbit that Shapley found for β = 0, and as β ↑ σ this orbit shrinks in diameter to
zero and tends to the point (EA, EB). For β ∈ (σ, 1) this periodic orbit no longer exists.
The proof of this Theorem is given in Section 5.1 (in the Appendix). Figure 5 (and later
figures up to Figure 7) allow us to illustrate schematically the relationship between regions Sij
where player A prefers strategy i and Player B prefers strategy j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3. The 9 squares in
these diagrams each represent one such region, as labelled. We think of the 3×3 checker board as
a torus, so that the top and bottom are identified, as are the left and right sides (so if we go for a
walk on the checkerboard and wander off the top, we return with the same horizontal coordinate
at the bottom, and similarly if we wander off the left of the diagram we return with the same
vertical coordinate on the right). With this convention, the diagram illustrates the adjacency
of regions; if just one player changes her preferred strategy, we cross a horizontal or vertical
line (representing a codimension-one set) to get to the new region. If we wish both players to
change their preferred strategies at the same instant, we must cross diagonally through a corner
(representing a codimension-two set) into a new region. Higher codimension points, such as the
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internal equilibrium (EA, EB) where all regions meet, are not represented. Note also that each
region is actually 4-dimensional, rather than 2 as represented in the diagram, and so if we wish
to project trajectories of the system onto the diagram we may find that they cross; certainly we
do not want to claim there is any sort of unique flow determined on the checkerboard.
The usefulness of these diagrams is that we may add arrows showing which transitions are
allowed, which we will use in the proof of the theorem. Thus, for example, if we imagine that
we begin in the top left-hand region where A → PA1 and B → PB2 then inspection of Figure 1
for β = 0 shows that the only region we can move to (and indeed will move to in due course)
is the region where A → PA2 and B → PB2 , as represented by the arrow between these two
regions in Figure 5. The other arrows are computed similarly. In regions such as A → PA1
and B → PB3 there is a codimension-one set such that trajectories started on this set will reach
indifference lines in ΣA and ΣB simultaneously. This set is represented by the dotted line in the
appropriate square in Figure 5, and similarly in other squares where this occurs. Finally, some of
the codimension one indifference surfaces are represented by dashed lines in the β = 0 case. This
is rather special, and is where the transversality condition of Proposition 2.1 fails; orbits move
off in different directions on opposite sides of these lines. Figure 6 for β < 0 is rather similar,
and the extra dotted lines are explained in the caption.
ΣB (i.e., p
B-coordinates)
A→ PA1 A→ PA2 A→ PA3
B → PB2
B → PB3 β = 0
B → PB1
ΣA-plane
(pA-coordinates)
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Figure 5: A diagram showing allowed transitions between regions of pure preference for β = 0. See the
text for explanations of dotted and dashed lines.
Let us call the discontinuity set the subset of Z∗ for which type (1) behaviour occurs. It has
(of course) measure zero.
Theorem 3.2 (The Shapley orbit is globally attracting for β ≤ 0). For β ≤ 0, the flow has a
unique closed orbit (the Shapley orbit); the flow of all initial conditions which do not enter the
discontinuity set tends to this closed orbit.
Proof. When β ≤ 0, then the only regions which can be entered are those marked with a central
integer label. So any trajectory which does not enter the discontinuity set, eventually enters one
of these regions. (These orbits form a set of zero Lebesgue measure.) From the diagram it is clear
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ΣB (i.e., p
B-coordinates)
A→ PA1 A→ PA2 A→ PA3
B → PB2
B → PB3 β < 0
ΣA-plane
(pA-coordinates)
B → PB1
1 2
3 4
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Figure 6: The transition diagram of the flow for β < 0. The dotted lines again indicate the codimension-
one sets where pA and pB leave the relevant regions simultaneously. The points where these dotted
lines meet, correspond to a set of initial conditions where the trajectory exits the region by hitting
EA = EB = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
that from then on the orbit cyclically visits the regions 1-6. Now consider, for example, the part
S1 of the space Z
A
1,2 where player A is indifferent between strategies P
A
2 and P
A
1 , and player B
strictly prefers strategy PB2 (this corresponds in the diagram to the line dividing regions labelled
1 and 2). Similarly consider the region S2 where the orbits leave region labelled 2. Each of these
sets Si is the product of a line segment and a kite-shaped quadrangle, with one boundary point
the equilibrium point E. Now consider the map T which assigns to a point in S1 the first visit
of the forward orbit through x to S2. Since all orbits in region 1 will aim for the same point and
only exit via S2 (when β ∈ (−1, 0]), this map is continuous; moreover, it has the property that
T (pA, pB) ∈ interior(S2) for each (pA, pB) ∈ S1 \ (S1 ∩ S2). In fact, T is a central projection. In
other words, if we put linear coordinates on S1 and S2 then T : S1 → S2 takes the form
T (z) =
1
f(z)
L(z) (3.10)
where L : S1 → S2 and f : S1 → R are affine transformations. So in linear coordinates,
T (x, y, z) =
(
a1 + b1x+ c1y + d1z
a+ bx+ cy + dz
,
a2 + b2x+ c2y + d2z
a+ bx+ cy + dz
,
a3 + b3x+ c3y + d3z
a+ bx+ cy + dz
)
.
(These maps are explicitly calculated in the appendix; here we shall only use that it is of this
form.) Note that compositions of such maps are again of this form. If
T1 =
1
f1
L1 and T2 =
1
f2
L2
are two such transformations and we take linear coordinates such that T1(0) = 0 (i.e. L1(0) = 0)
16
then the composition formula becomes particularly simple:
T2 ◦ T1 = 1
f2(T1(z)) · f1(z)L2 ◦ L1(z). (3.11)
Note that because of cancellations f2(T1(z)) · f1(z) actually is an affine map in z.
Now let P be the first return map to S1. As we observed P is a continuous central projection
as above (it is composition of such maps), so of the form z 7→ P (z) = 1f(z)L(z) with P (S1) ⊂ S1
and, because T : S1 → S2 maps all points except those in S1 ∩S2 into interior(S2) (and similarly
for the other transition maps),
P (S1) ⊂ interior(S1) ∪ E. (3.12)
In addition, P has a fixed p in the interior of S1 corresponding to the Shapley periodic orbit. Let
us show that limn→∞ P
n(x)→ p for each x ∈ S1 \ E, where Pn is the n-th iterate of P . To see
this, notice that P sends lines to lines and restricted to each line, T is a Moebius transformation,
i.e. of the form t 7→ α+tβγ+tδ (where we take affine coordinates on the lines). Let us first consider
the line l0 through p and E, and let b be so that l0∩S1 = [E, b]. This line l0 is mapped into itself
because p,E ∈ l0 are both fixed points. P : l0 → l0 is a Moebius transformation which sends the
line segment [E, b] = l0 ∩ S1 continuously into [a, b) (this is because of (3.12)) and having fixed
point p ∈ (E, b). It follows from this that for any x ∈ (E, b], limn→∞ Pn(x) → p. Now consider
any other eigendirection l through x. Because of (3.12), P maps l∩S1 continuously strictly inside
itself, and since the restriction of P to this line is a Moebius transformation, again all points in
l ∩ S1 converge to p. It P has a complex eigenvalue then the argument is similar.
To consider any other point x, take the projective space P of lines through p in S1. The
return map P assigns to each line xˆ ∈ P a new line Pˆ (xˆ) ∈ P. The eigenvalues of the linear
transformation L correspond to fixed points of Pˆ , and for each line l through x in S1, P
n(l)
tends to an eigenspace of the linearisation of P at x. Combining this with the above, it follows
that for each x ∈ S1 \ E, Pn(x)→ p.
It follows that for the original flow all trajectories which do not enter the discontinuity set
are attracted to the periodic Shapley orbit.
This theorem completes our investigation of β ≤ 0.
3.3 Existence and Stability of a Shapley and also an anti-Shapley pe-
riodic orbit for β > 0
Let us now consider orbits when β ∈ (0, 1). The transition diagram for this case is given in
Figure 7 and it is immediately clear that there are now many more possible routes that may
be taken from region to region. We stress that the existence of a possible route allowed by the
arrows, does not necessarily imply the existence of a corresponding trajectory in the flow; we
will need to perform some calculations to see which routes are actually realised for any given
value of β. In this figure the dashed lines represent codimension-one sets of points from which
trajectories tend, for one or other player, to EA or EB. The sequence of regions visited will be
different depending which side of these sets you begin. [We should note that the dashed curves
do not move entirely across the squares as β → 1 (because the points in Figure 4 marked with •
in ΣB still have not reached the corners of ΣB when β = 1).]
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A→ PA1 A→ PA2 A→ PA3
B → PB2
B → PB3 1 ≥ β > 0
B → PB1
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Figure 7: The transition diagram of the flow for β ∈ (0, 1). Boxes again represent regions Sij , and arrows
indicate possible transitions between regions. Routes may now spiral around near the ‘corners’ marked
with ∗; these 6 corners represent codimension-two points on the six pieces of J . The 3 corners marked z
represent codimension-two points on the 3 pieces of Z∗ \J and trajectories cross these sets transversally;
there is no spiralling. The numbers 1 − 6 in the regions show a possible route for an anticlockwise
periodic orbit. Notice that the route for the clockwise Shapley orbit is still also allowed. The dashed
lines correspond to preimages of points (EA, pB) or (pA, EB), whereas the dotted lines correspond to
preimages of Z∗ \ J , but where the orbits will cross transversally as in case (1) above. When β = 1 the
situation remains almost the same except that it is no longer possible to have two types of exits from the
regions with the dotted lines (no exit is possible in the horizontal direction in the three relevant boxes,
but this restriction does not prevent the continued existence of the anticlockwise route marked).
We show in the Appendix, by direct calculation, that precisely one of the anticlockwise or
clockwise orbits mentioned in the figure caption exists when β 6= σ, where σ = (−1 + √5)/2,
the golden mean. In particular, for β ∈ [−1, σ) there is an attracting orbit which goes round the
midpoint of ΣA and ΣB in an clockwise fashion (this is a continuous deformation of Shapley’s
periodic orbit for β = 0, which we have already studied in the previous section for β ≤ 0),
whereas for β ∈ (σ, 1) there is a different periodic orbit which goes around these points in a
anticlockwise fashion. It is attracting for some interval of β values to be described further below,
and is otherwise of saddle-type.
Theorem 3.3 (Existence and stability of the Shapley and anti-Shapley periodic orbits). For
β ∈ [0, σ) there exists the periodic orbit mentioned already in Theorem 3.1, i.e. it visits, in
the same order, the same regions as the Shapley orbit of Theorem 3.2. This is a continuous
deformation of that orbit, and as β ↑ σ this orbit shrinks in diameter to zero and tends to the
point (EA, EB). This orbit is stable for all β ∈ [0, σ).
For β ∈ (σ, 1) there exists a periodic orbit (anticlockwise) which visits the regions marked 1-6
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in Figure 7 cyclically in order, i.e., follow the following pattern:
time 1 2 3 4 5 6
strategy player A 1 1 3 3 2 2
strategy player B 3 2 2 1 1 3
As β ↓ σ this orbit shrinks in diameter to zero and tends to the point (EA, EB). Such a periodic
orbit does NOT exist when β < σ.
Shapley’s (clockwise) periodic orbit is attracting for all β ∈ [0, σ). The anti-Shapley (anti-
clockwise) periodic orbit which exists for β ∈ (σ, 1) is attracting when β ∈ (τ, 1) and of saddle-type
when β ∈ (σ, τ). Here τ is the root of some specific expression and is approximately 0.915.
We remark that it does not seem to be possible to prove the existence of the anticlockwise
orbit, even when β = 1, by the same sort of technique as we used to prove the existence of the
clockwise orbit in β ≤ 0. This is because even when β = 1 the relevant version of Figure 7
still allows many routes through the diagram; it was only because there was only a single route
possible in the β ≤ 0 case that we were able to deduce that an orbit following that route must
exist. Neither the Shapley nor the anti-Shapley orbits attract every starting position: as we show
in the sequel to this paper Sparrow & van Strien (2006), there are an uncountable number of
orbits which tend to the interior equilibrium point. The existence of one such orbit is shown in
the next subsection.
The proof of this Theorem is in the Appendix, as is a discussion of the bifurcation at β = τ .
3.4 Dynamics and a periodic orbit Γ on the set J
We will now consider the flow on the set J (more precisely, the unique continuous extension of the
flow to J). The dynamics near J is very interesting because orbits can spiral for very long time-
lengths near J , before moving away. Because on J at least one of the two players is indifferent
between two strategies, nearby orbits correspond to behaviour where players frequently switch
their preferred behaviour.
We shall prove here that trajectories on J visit the six pieces cyclically (in the order in which
they appear in the definition in equation (3.8)), and the details of the behaviour are given in the
following proposition (see Figure 8).
Theorem 3.4 (A third periodic which is created by a Hopf-like bifurcation). The system has a
Hopf-like bifurcation when β = σ on the topological two-dimensional manifold J . Trajectories on
J spiral towards (EA, EB) when β ∈ (0, σ] while for β ∈ (σ, 1) all trajectories in J (except the
one stationary at (EA, EB)) tend to a periodic orbit Γ in J .
We denote the endpoints of Γ along the pieces of J by fAij and f
B
kl , as in Figure 8. Then for
β ∈ (σ, 1) one has the following formulas for the ‘diameter’ of the periodic orbit Γ:
|EBkl − fBkl |
|QBkl − fBkl |
=
|fAij −mAij |
|RAij − EAij |
=
β2 + β − 1
2β + 1
and
|fBkl − EBkl|
|RBkl − EBkl|
=
|EAij − fAij |
|QAij − fAij |
=
β2 + β − 1
(1 + β)2
.
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Note that these expressions are both increasing in β ∈ (σ, 1) and are zero when β = σ (but unlike
the usual Hopf-bifurcation the diameter increases roughly linearly when β−σ > 0 is small). They
achieve their maximum 1/3, 1/4 both at β = 1.
The proof of this Theorem is a tedious calculation and can be found in the appendix. Note
that it is also argued there that trajectories spiralling into (EA, EB) on J for β < σ, or out of it
for β > σ, do so in finite time. There is genuine non-uniqueness of the flow at (EA, EB) reflecting
the fact that it is the only point (for β > 0) at which we cannot continuously extend the flow.
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Figure 8: The simplices ΣA and ΣB . Various points on the sets ZA and ZB (and their extensions) are
drawn. RA23 =
1
2+β
(1 + β, 1, 0), QA12 =
1
1+2β
(β, 1 + β, 0) (and similarly formulas for the other points by
cyclically permuting coordinates). Similarly RB12 =
1
2−β
(1, 1 − β, 0) and QB13 =
1
1+β
(β, 1, 0). The points
fAij , f
B
kl give the maximum extent of the periodic orbit on J (β > σ only). Take (p
A, pB) ∈ (ZB1,2 × Z
A
3,1)
as starting points. Then pA(t) moves along ZB1,2 towards R
A
12 and p
B(t) moves towards the midpoint
of ΣB along Z
A
1,3. Once p
B(t) hits the midpoint of ΣB (provided p
A(t) 6= (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)) then the flow
extends continuously and (pA(t), pB(t)) enters ZB1,2 × Z
A
1,2. Along this set p
A(t) then moves back along
ZB1,2 towards the midpoint in ΣA while p
B(t) moves towards RB12. Next it enters the third part of J , and
in this way the orbit spirals (cyclically) around the different legs of J .
3.5 Dithering and chaotic behaviour near J
It is not true that this orbit is attracting for orbits that start off J . Nonetheless, orbits of the
system for β > σ can spend long times near to this orbit J . The reason for this is that orbits can
spiral along cones whose axes consist of the 6 legs of the periodic orbit on J in the way described
in Figure 3. The next two figure below shows a portion of a numerically computed trajectory for
β = 0.8. The orbit shown, starts near the centre, and during the time interval considered comes
close to the periodic orbit J , while jittering a large number of times near this orbit. Notice that
the short time intervals and the large number of time the players switch strategies.
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The same orbit shown for a later time interval, shows that orbits eventually become less
periodic.
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In fact, as will be made precise in Sparrow & van Strien (2006), one has chaotic motion for
β ∈ [σ, τ ]. The figures below show orbits for β = 0.9, both showing erratic time-series and the
attracting set projected on ΣA and ΣB.
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β = 0.9
ΣA simplex ΣB simplex
4 Conclusion
For β ∈ (−1, 0] players always asymptotically become periodic. When β ∈ (0, σ) the Shapley
orbit is still attracting but not globally attracting: there are orbits as described in Theorem 3.4
which tend to E. In a sequel to this paper we shall show that there are infinitely many such
cone-like sets consisting of points which tend to E. (So the stable manifold of E is extremely
complicated.)
The numerical results showed that for β ∈ (σ, τ) players act erratically and chaotically.
In the sequel to this paper we shall give rigorous results which explain this behaviour. The
mathematical methodology in this sequel paper will be more geometric (and will be based on
first projecting the flow on a three-sphere and then by a study of the first return dynamics to a
global two-dimensional section consisting of a disc bounded by the periodic orbit Γ).
Finally, when β ∈ (τ, 1) orbits tend to a so-called anti-Shapley orbit.
Of course most of the analysis we described also could be applied to other families (with less
symmetry). We will go into this in the sequel to this paper. Finally, simulations and preliminary
theoretical considerations indicate that for n × n games with n > 3 there are other routes to
chaotic behaviour than those studied here.
Acknowledgements. We are grateful to the anonymous referee and an associate editor for
helpful comments and suggestions.
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5 Appendix
In this appendix we collect together a number of explicit calculations that are used in the main
text.
It is convenient to work in the space (vA, vB) where vA = ApB and vB = pAB (so vA is
a column vector, and vB is a row vector). From the description of the dynamics in the main
text, when vAi is the largest coordinate of v
A, player A adjusts pA towards PAi , which implies v
B
moves in a straight line towards Bi, the i
th row of B. Similarly, if vBj is the largest component of
vB, vA moves towards Aj , the j
th column of A. In both cases, our convention is that the motion
occurs at a speed such that from a given initial condition, and assuming that i and j were to
remain the maximal coordinates of vA and vB , the vectors would reach Bi and Aj in one unit of
time. So, for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, provided the maximal coordinate of vA or vB does not change, we can
write
vA(t+ s) = vA(t) + s(Aj − vA(t))
vB(t+ s) = vB(t) + s(Bi − vB(t)) . (5.13)
Each time that the maximal coordinate of either vA or vB changes, we reset s in (5.13) to zero.
In this appendix we calculate explicit orbits with particular properties, using these equations.
We illustrate our calculations with figures that show the development of the components of vA
and vB with time. Let σ = (−1 +√5)/2, the golden mean.
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5.1 Existence of the clockwise Shapley orbit in β ∈ (−1, σ)
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Figure 9: Components of vA and vB plotted against time for one third of the symmetric Shapley
(clockwise) periodic orbit which exists for β ∈ [0, σ). Since vB2 is maximal throughout, v
A(t) moves
towards A2 = (0, 1, β)
T . In the interval [0, t1] coordinate v
A
1 is maximal and v
B(t) moves towards
B1 = (−β, 1, 0); in the interval [t1, t1 + t2], v
A
2 is maximal and v
B(t) moves towards B2 = (0,−β, 1).
Let us compute the clockwise Shapley periodic orbit which, as we will see, exists for β ∈
(−1, σ). The periodic orbit we are looking for is rotation symmetric, so we will only compute the
part of the orbit where player B prefers strategy 2 (while player A prefers first strategy 1 and
then strategy 2); see Figure 9.
Let n = (n1, n2, n3)
T and m = (m1,m2,m3) be the initial values of v
A and vB respectively.
Then we require, as shown in the figure, that
n1 > max(n2, n3) and m1 = m2 > m3 , (5.14)
so that initially vA heads towards A2 = (0, 1, β)
T and vB towards (−β, 1, 0) = B1. The first time
t1 that the orbit meets Z again is when the first and second coordinates of v
A(t) = (1 − t)nT +
t(0, 1, β)T become equal which occurs when t = t1 > 0,
t1 =
n1 − n2
n1 − n2 + 1 .
(Of course, it is possible that we first get that n1 = n3, but this does not occur because n1 = n3
happens when t′ = n1−n3n1−n3+β which is larger than t1 as β < 1.) The v
A and vB values at t = t1
are
vA(t1) =
1
(n1 − n2 + 1)

 n1n2 + (n1 − n2)
n3 + (n1 − n2)β


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and
vB(t1) =
1
(n1 − n2 + 1) (m1 − β(n1 − n2), m2 + (n1 − n2), m3) .
Next we have that t2 > 0 is the smallest number so that the second and third coordinate of
vB(t1 + t2) = (1 − t2)vB(t1) + t2(0,−β, 1) are equal. This gives
t2 =
m2(t1)−m3(t1)
m2(t1)−m3(t1) + 1 + β =
(m2 −m3) + (n1 − n2)
(m2 −m3) + (n1 − n2) + (1 + β)(1 + n1 − n2)
which implies
vA(t1 + t2) =
1
X

 n1(1 + β)n1(1 + β) + δ
((n3 + (n1 − n2)β)(1 + β) + βδ)

 , (5.15)
and
vB(t1 + t2) =
1 + β
X
((m1 − β(n1 − n2)), (m2 + (n1 − n2))− βδ, m3 + δ/(1 + β)) (5.16)
where δ = (m2 −m3) + (n1 − n2) and X = δ + (1 + β)(1 + n1 − n2). For a symmetric periodic
orbit we have to satisfy
vA(t1 + t2) =

 n3n1
n2

 and vB(t1 + t2) =

 m3m1
m1

 , (5.17)
and the strict inequalities (5.14). Solving equations (5.15)–(5.17) by hand (or by a MAPLE
worksheet 13 gives
n1 = ν (5.18)
n2 = −−2β
2 − β3 + 2 νβ3 − 3 ν β − 2 ν + 3 ν2 + 3 ν2 β2 + 3 ν2 β
1 + β + β2
, (5.19)
n3 =
2 β + 1+ 2 ν β3 − ν β2 − 4 ν β − 3 ν + 3 ν2 + 3 ν2 β2 + 3 ν2 β
1 + β + β2
, (5.20)
m2 = m1 = 1− ν − νβ (5.21)
m3 = −β + 2νβ − 1 + 2ν, (5.22)
where ν satisfies fβ(ν) = 0 with
fβ(Z) =
(
3β2 + 3β + 3
)
Z3 +
(
2β3 − 2β2 − 5β − 4)Z2 + (−β3 + 4β + 3)Z − 1− β . (5.23)
Note that for β ∈ (−1, 1), fβ(0) = −1− β < 0 and fβ(1) = β3 + β2 + β+1 > 0. For β ∈ (−1, 1),
the function t 7→ fβ(t) is monotone because its derivative
f ′β(Z) = 3
(
3β2 + 3β + 3
)
Z2 + 2
(
2β3 − 2β2 − 5β − 4)Z + (−β3 + 4β + 3) (5.24)
is a strictly postive quadratic function; this is because its discriminant is equal to 16β6 + 4β5 −
28β4 − 92β3 − 88β2 − 92β − 44 and so is negative when β ∈ (−1, 1). Hence, for β ∈ (−1, 1)
13which can be downloaded from http://www.maths.warwick.ac.uk/∼strien/Publications
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the cubic (5.23) has a unique real root ν, and this root is in (0, 1). Moreover, this solution ν
depends continuously on β. When β = 0, this solution satisfies the inequalities that guarantee the
behaviour is as shown in the figure: indeed when β = 0 then we obtain n1 = 0.594.., n2 = 0.129..,
n3 = 0.277.., m1 = m2 = 0.405.., m3 = 0.188...
Let us show that equalities can only hold in (5.14) when β /∈ (−1, 1) or β = σ. If m1 = m3
then the expressions for m1 and m3 give νβ = (2 + β)/(3 + 3β) and then
fβ(νβ) = − (β
2 + β − 1)(1 + β + β2)2
9(1 + β)3
= 0;
this implies that either β /∈ (−1, 1) or β is equal to the golden mean σ. If n1 = n3 then because
of the first equation in (5.17) the first two components vA(t1 + t2) in (5.15) are equal, and so
δ = 0; using these two equation again we get n1 − n2 = 0 and with δ = 0 this implies m1 = m3
and therefore as we saw β /∈ (−1, 1) or β = σ. If n1 = n2 then X = δ + 1 + β and
vA(t1 + t2) =
1
X

 n1(1 + β)n1(1 + β) + δ
n3(1 + β) + βδ

 =

 n3n1
n1


which gives that δn3 + δ = βδ and so either δ = 0 or n3 = β − 1 and so ν = n1 = n2 = 1. The
latter is impossible because fβ(1) > 0 while the latter implies that m2 = m3 ( we assumed that
n1 = n2); as we showed above m2 = m3 implies β /∈ (−1, 1) or β = σ.
It follows that there exists a symmetric clockwise periodic orbit for all β ∈ (−1, σ), depending
continuously on β. As β ↑ σ this periodic orbit shrinks to the equilibrium solution n1 = n2 =
n3 = (1 + β)/3 and m1 = m2 = m3 = (1 − β)/3. To see this, notice that fβ((1 + β)/3) = 0 is a
fifth order equation which can be factorized as
1
3
(1 + β)(β2 + β − 1)(β2 − β + 1) = 0
which is zero if β = σ or β /∈ (−1, 1). If β ∈ (σ, 1) the inequalities in (5.14) no longer hold. This
can be seen by considering the solutions for β = 1 in (5.18-5.22).
5.2 Existence of the anticlockwise periodic orbit when β ∈ (σ, 1).
We first show that for σ < β ≤ 1 there exists a unique symmetric anticlockwise periodic orbit as
described in Theorem 3.3in the main text.
For such an orbit to exist, with the appropriate symmetry, the vectors vA and vB must behave
as shown in Figure 10 below.
We compute only the part of the orbit where player B prefers strategy 2, starting where player
B is indifferent between strategies 2 and 3, and ending where player B is indifferent between
strategies 1 and 2. During this interval, player A prefers first strategy 1 and then strategy 3.
We then use the rotational symmetry to determine whether this corresponds to a periodic orbit.
The complete orbit consists of three such sections, with the coordinates permuted cyclically on
each section.
As before, to avoid too many sub and superscripts, let n = (n1, n2, n3)
T be the initial value
vA(0), and m = (m1,m2,m3) be the initial value v
B(0). So the starting position given in the
figure satisfies
n1 > n2, n3 and m2 = m3 > m1 , (5.25)
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Figure 10: Components of vA and vB plotted against time for one third of the symmetric (anticlockwise)
periodic orbit which exists for β ∈ (σ, 1). Note that the identity of the maximal coordinate of vA
determines the motion of vB , and vice versa. Since vB2 is maximal throughout, v
A(t) moves towards
A2 = (0, 1, β)
T in both time intervals. In the interval [0, t1] coordinate v
A
1 is maximal and v
B(t) moves
towards B1 = (−β, 1, 0); in the interval [t1, t1 + t2], v
A
3 is maximal and v
B(t) moves towards B3 =
(1, 0,−β).
and the orbit in vA, vB space initially heads to respectively (0, 1, β)T = A2 and (−β, 1, 0) = B1
as we require. The first time that the orbit meets Z (the indifference set) again in t > 0 is when
the first and third coordinates of
vA(t) = (1− t)n+ t

 01
β

 (5.26)
become equal and player A becomes indifferent between strategies 1 and 3. Solving vA1 (t) = v
A
3 (t)
in (5.26) for t = t1 > 0, we obtain
t1 =
n1 − n3
n1 − n3 + β . (5.27)
Of course, depending on the values of the ni it is possible that we first get that n1(t) = n2(t) for
some t ∈ (0, t1). Since we are not interested in this case, we insist that this does not occur and
so our initial condition satisfies
(n1 − n2)β > (n1 − n3). (5.28)
Note that the motion of vB ensures that the largest coordinate of vB must be vB2 for the whole
of the period (0, t1), so there is no danger that player B becomes indifferent before player A.
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The vA and vB values at t = t1 are, using (5.13),
vA(t1) =
1
(n1 − n3 + β)

 βn1βn2 + n1 − n3
βn1

 (5.29)
and
vB(t1) =
1
(n1 − n3 + β) (βm1 − β(n1 − n3), βm2 + (n1 − n3), βm3) . (5.30)
After this moment, player A changes direction and so vB = pAB heads for (1, 0,−β) and t2 > 0
becomes the smallest number so that the first and second coordinates of vB(t1 + t2) = (1 −
t2)v
B(t1) + t2(1, 0,−β) become equal. This occurs when
t2 =
vB2 (t1)− vB1 (t1)
vB2 (t1)− vB1 (t1) + 1
=
β(m2 −m1) + (1 + β)(n1 − n3)
β(m2 −m1) + (2 + β)(n1 − n3) + β . (5.31)
Hence, writing
δ = β(m2 −m1) + (1 + β)(n1 − n3)
we have
t2 =
δ
δ + β + n1 − n3 .
Using (5.13) again, this implies
vA(t1 + t2) =
1
δ + β + n1 − n3

 n1βn1 − n3 + n2β + δ
n1β + βδ

 , (5.32)
and
vB(t1 + t2) =
1
δ + β + n1 − n3 ((βm2 + n1 − n3), (βm2 + n1 − n3), β(m2 − δ)) . (5.33)
To get an anticlockwise symmetric periodic orbit we require that
vA(t1 + t2) =

 n2n3
n1

 and vB(t1 + t2) =

 m2m2
m1

 . (5.34)
Combining (5.32), (5.33) and (5.34), we need to solve the following equations:
n1 · β = n2 · (δ + n1 − n3 + β)
n1 − n3 + n2 · β + δ = n3 · (δ + n1 − n3 + β)
n1 · β + β · δ = n1 · (δ + n1 − n3 + β)
m2 · β + n1 − n3 = m2 · (δ + n1 − n3 + β)
m2 · β − β · δ = m1 · (δ + n1 − n3 + β)
(5.35)
and, collecting together (5.25) and (5.28), we require solutions to (5.35) that satisfy the strict
inequalities
m2 = m3 > m1, n1 > max(n2, n3) and (n1 − n2)β > n1 − n3 . (5.36)
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It is straightforward to check using the computer algebra package MAPLE,14 or more labo-
riously by hand, 15 that solutions to the equalities (5.35) satisfy:
m2 = m3 = µ,
m1 = −β + 1− 2µ,
n1 = β − µβ
n2 =
2 β2 + 1− 3µβ3 − 5µβ2 − 2µβ − 2µ+ 3µ2 β2 + 3µ2 β + 3µ2 β3
β + 1 + β2
.
n3 = −β
2 − β − 4µβ3 − 6µβ2 − 3µβ − 2µ+ 3µ2 β2 + 3µ2 β + 3µ2 β3
β + 1 + β2
,
where µ satisfies fβ(µ) = 0 and where
fβ(Z) =
(
3β2 + 3 β + 3 β3
)
Z3 +
(−5 β3 − 7 β2 − 4 β − 2 ) Z2+
+
(
1 + β + 5β2 + 2β3
)
Z − β2 . (5.37)
Note that for β ∈ (0, 1), fβ(0) = −β2 < 0 and fβ(1) = −2 < 0 while fβ(1/3) = (2/9)β3+1/9 > 0.
This implies that the cubic polynomial (5.37) always has three roots µ, two in (0, 1) and one
in (1,∞). When β = 1, the only of these three roots which leads to a solution satisfying the
inequalities (5.36) has µ = 0.155.., so n1 = 0.844.., n2 = 0.449.., n3 = 0.706.., m1 = −0.311..,
and m2 = m3 = 0.155... This solution (which depends on β) continues to exist as β decreases,
and gives a periodic orbit of the desired type until one of the strict inequalities (5.36) fails to
hold. Let us check what happens if one of these inequalities fails, still assuming β ∈ (0, 1). If
m1 = m2 then by the expressions above, µ = (1 − β)/3. If n1 = n2 then by the first and third
equations in (5.35), δ = 0 and either n1 = n2 = n3 or n1 = 0 and so µ = 1 (which is impossible
because 1 is not a root of fβ). If n1 = n3 then the first three equations in (5.35) imply n1 = β
or δ = 0; if n1 = β then using the formula for n1 we get β = β−µβ and so either β = 0 or µ = 0
(both of which are impossible) whereas if δ = 0 (and n1 = n3) then m1 = m2 and so, from the
previous argument, µ = (1 − β)/3. If (n1 − n3)β = n1 − n2 then manipulating the first three
equations in (5.35) we get 1/(1 − β) = β (which is impossible since β ∈ (0, 1)) or δ = 0 which
in turn implies n1 = n2 = n3 or n1 − n2 + 1 = 0 which (after some manipulations) gives n1 = 0
and so µ = 0 which again is impossible. In other words, the only way the inequalities can break
down is when µ becomes equal to µ = (1− β)/3. But if we substitute Z = (1− β)/3 into (5.37)
we obtain a sixth order equation which can be factorized as
−1
9
(β2c + βc − 1)(βc + 1 + β2c )2 = 0 .
Hence the critical value βc of β is equal to the golden mean σ (since the other solutions of
the sixth order polynomial in β are negative or complex). It is straightforward to check that
14which can be downloaded from http://www.maths.warwick.ac.uk/∼strien/Publications
15If manipulating these equations by hand, it is useful to observe that the solution must satisfy
n1 + n2 + n3 = 1 + β and m1 +m2 +m3 = 1− β
which come from the definitions of vA and vB and the fact that pA and pB are probability vectors.
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for all β ∈ (0, 1) the solution generated by the other root of (5.37) fails to satisfy the strict
inequalities (5.36). Thus we have shown that there is unique symmetric anticlockwise periodic
orbit as described in the proposition for β ∈ (σ, 1] and none otherwise. Furthermore, the orbit
shrinks down to the interior equilibrium as β ↓ σ.
5.3 Stability of the anticlockwise and clockwise periodic orbits
As stated in the main text:
Proposition 5.1. Shapley’s periodic orbit is attracting for all β ∈ [0, σ). The anticlockwise orbit
which exists for β ∈ (σ, 1) is attracting when β ∈ (τ, 1) and of saddle-type when β ∈ (σ, τ). Here
τ is a root of a specific expression whose value is a little larger than 0.915.
Proof. Let us just show the computation for the anticlockwise periodic orbit, because in that case
an interesting bifurcation occurs. Since
∑
ni = 1 + β and
∑
mi = 1 − β, we shall perturb the
initial conditions considered in Section 5.2 above to n′1 = n1+ ǫ1, n
′
2 = n2+ ǫ2, n
′
3 = n3− ǫ1− ǫ2
while m′1 = m1 − 2ǫ3, m′2 = m′3 = m2 + ǫ3. Repeating the calculation of Section 5.2 with these
perturbed values we find that after slightly altered times t′1 and t
′
2 we arrive at a final position
vA(t′1 + t
′
2) with coordinates v
A
1 (t1 + t2) + γ1, v
A
2 (t1 + t2) + γ2, v
A
3 (t1 + t2)− γ1 − γ2 and a final
position for vB(t′1 + t
′
2) with coordinates v
B
1 (t1 + t2) + γ3, v
B
1 (t1 + t2) + γ3, v
B
3 (t1 + t2) − 2γ3
where

 γ1γ2
γ3

 = n2
n1β

 β(3 + 2β)− n12(2 + β) β(1 − n1 + β)− 2n1 3β
2 − 3n1β
β − 2n2(2 + β) −n2(2 + β) −3n2β
2− 2(β−n1)(2+β)β 1− (β−n1)(2+β)β 3n1 − 2β



 ǫ1ǫ2
ǫ3


plus higher order terms. 16 One can compute the eigenvalues of this matrix using MAPLE; one
of of them is n2/n1, while the others are given as rather complicated (but exact) formulae in n1,
n2 and β:
n2
(
−2n1β − n1 − 2n2 − n2β + 2β2 +±
√
∆
)
2n1β
, (5.38)
where
∆ := 10n1 n2 β + 4n1 n2 − 4n2 β2 − 4n2 β3 − 8n1 β3 + 4 β4 + 4n22 + 4n22β+
4n1
2β2 + 4n1
2β + n2
2β2 + 4n2 β
2n1 − 8n1 β2 + n12 − 4n2 β − 8n1 β + 4 β2 + 4 β3
Using the explicit formulae for ni computed in Section 5.2, and by inserting these in the ex-
pressions for the eigenvalues, we find that the eigenvalues are expressions in β. When β = 1,
these are 0.532.., −0.815.., and −0.184.. (where the first one is n2/n1). One can check that as β
varies the eigenvalues (5.38) always remain negative. By numerically evaluating the expressions
for these (which can be done as accurately as required) we find that one of them crosses −1
when β is equal to τ where τ is roughly 0.915 while the other remains, for all β ∈ (σ, 1), in
(−1, 0). Consideration of the sizes and signs of the eigenvalues described shows that for β > τ
the periodic orbit is attracting, and for β < τ it becomes of saddle-type.
16This matrix can be deduced from equations (5.35), where it is convenient to observe that we can use the first
of those equations to write (δ + n1 − n3 + β) = βn1/n2.
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Note that we do not have a generic periodic doubling bifurcation 17 when one of the eigenval-
ues becomes equal to −1. Indeed, at this parameter the linear part of the above transformation
has an eigenvector V associated to the eigenvalue −1. However, the transition map which sends
the hyperplane m2 = m3 to the hyperplane m1 = m2 is a composition of central projections
(see the proof of Theorem 3.2. In particular, it sends the line through V to the line through
V (remember V is an eigenvector) and it is a linear fractional transformation on this line with
derivative −1 at the fixed point. But taking a map of the form f(x) = −x+ αx2 + γx3 + ... we
always have f2(x) = x+ 0x2 + (?)x3. So in our case we get that the second iterate of the linear
fractional transformation is equal to the identity map up to second order at the fixed point. But
this implies that it is in fact equal to the identity map. So instead of a generic periodic doubling
bifurcation, in this case we get non-generic dynamics at the bifurcation parameter β = τ ; at this
parameter value there is a one-parameter family (continuum) of periodic orbits.
The computation showing that Shapley’s periodic orbit is attracting for all β ∈ (0, σ) goes
similarly.
5.4 Dynamics and a periodic orbit on the set J
We will now consider, again using vA, vB space, the flow on the codimension two indifference set
J defined in the main text. Recall that the flow which remains on J is the unique continuous
extension to J of the flow off J , everywhere except at the interior equilibrium.
Proposition 5.2. The system has a Hopf-like bifurcation when β = σ on the topological two-
dimensional manifold J . The orbits on J spiral towards the interior equilibrium E = (EA, EB)
when β ∈ (0, σ] while for β ∈ (σ, 1) all orbits in J (except the one remaining at E) tend to a
periodic orbit Γ on J .
Proof. Again we compute a segment of orbit which makes one third of a complete rotation around
the interior equilibrium, and use the rotational symmetry to compute the whole orbit. We take
an initial condition vA = n and vB = m where n2 = n3 > n1 and m1 = m2 = m3 = (1− β/3).
Player A (whose preferences depend on vA) is at first indifferent between strategies 2 and
3, and so adjusts pA towards some convex combination of P2 and P3, implying that v
B moves
towards the same convex combination of B2 and B3. The convex combination
(1 + β)
(2 + β)
B2 +
1
(2 + β)
B3 =
1
(2 + β)
(1, −β(1 + β), 1) (5.39)
is chosen so that the orbit remains in J , i.e. so that vB1 (t) = v
B
3 (t) in t > 0. (We stress again that
this is not in any sense an arbitry choice; it is the unique choice giving a continuous extension
of the flow defined off the codimension two indifference surface.) Consequently player B will, for
t > 0, be indifferent between strategies 1 and 3, will adjust pB towards some convex combination
of PB1 and P
B
3 , and so v
A will move towards the same convex combination of A1 and A3. In this
case, the combination
1
(1 + β)
A1 +
β
(1 + β)
A3 =
1
(1 + β)
(1 + β2, β, β)T (5.40)
17as would be expected in a normal differential equation
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Figure 11: Part of the periodic orbit on J with (vA, vB) plotted against time.
is chosen so that vA2 (t) = v
A
3 (t) in t > 0.
This motion continues until a time t1 ∈ (0, 1) at which vA1 (t1) = vA2 (t1) = vA3 (t1) = 13 (1 + β)
so that t1 satisfies, using (5.13) and (5.40)
vA(t1) = (1 − t1)vA(0) + t1 1
1 + β

 1 + β
2
β
β

 = 1 + β
3

 11
1

 .
Hence
t1 =
(n2 − n1)(1 + β)
(n2 − n1)(1 + β) + (1 + β2 − β) .
We have also, from (5.13) and (5.39),
vB(t1) = v
B(0)(1− t1) + t1 1
2 + β
(
1, −β − β2, 1) .
Now since vBi (0) = (1 − β)/3 for i = 1, 2, 3, we have
vB1 (t1)− vB2 (t1) =
t1
2 + β
[1 + β + β2] . (5.41)
Player A now becomes indifferent between strategies 1 and 3, while player B is still indifferent
between strategies 1 and 3 (inspection shows this is the only way to remain on J). In the interval
t ∈ (t1, t1 + t2) we have that vA(t) heads for
(1− β)
(2− β)A1 +
1
(2− β)A3 =
1
(2− β) (1, β(1 − β), 1)
T
(5.42)
34
and vB(t) heads for
(1 + β)
(1 + 2β)
B1 +
β
(1 + 2β)
B3 =
1
(1 + 2β)
(−β2, 1 + β, −β2) . (5.43)
Using (5.13) and (5.43) we seek to compute t2 such that v
B(t1 + t2) =
(1−β)
3 (1, 1, 1). This gives
t2
[
1
(1 + 2β)
(−β2, 1 + β, −β2)− vB(t1)
]
=
1
3
(1− β)(1, 1, 1)− vB(t1)
which implies
t2 =
vB1 (t1)− vB2 (t1)
1+β+β2
1+2β + v
B
1 (t1)− vB2 (t1)
=
t1(1 + 2β)
t1(1 + 2β) + (2 + β)
.
Now (5.13), (5.42) and the fact that all components of vA(t1) are equal imply that
vA1 (t1 + t2)− vA2 (t1 + t2) =
t2
2− β
[
1− β + β2] .
Substituting in for t2 and then for t1 we obtain
vA1 (t1 + t2)− vA2 (t1 + t2) =
t1(1 + 2β)
(t1(1 + 2β) + (2 + β))
(1− β + β2)
(2− β) =
=
(n2 − n1)
(n2 − n1)3(1 + β)2 + (2 + β)(1 − β + β2)
(1 + β)(1 + 2β)(1− β + β2)
(2− β) .
This formula gives us the value of |vA1 (t)− vA2 (t)| at the end of the two legs, as a function F () of
the initial value |n2 − n1|, where
F (X) :=
X(1 + β)(1 + 2β)(1 − β + β2)
(2− β) (3(1 + β)2X + (2 + β)(1 + β2 − β)) .
Now F is a linear fractional transformation F (X) = aXbX+c and
F ′(0) =
a
c
=
(1 + β)(1 + 2β)(1− β + β2)
(2− β)(2 + β)(1 − β + β2) =
2β2 + 3β + 1
−β2 + 4
which is less than 1 when β < σ and greater than 1 when β > σ. Since F (X) → 1 as X → ∞,
this implies that x 7→ F (x) has zero as an attracting fixed point when β ∈ (0, σ], and there exists
an attracting fixed point x > 0 of F when β > σ. This solution x corresponds to the value of
n2 − n1 for which there is an associated periodic orbit Γ on J . This orbit attracts all orbits on
J except the one starting at the interior equilibrium (EA, EB).
To prove the last past of the proposition, note that F (X) = X is equivalent to
X =
(1 + β2 − β)(β2 + β − 1)
(2− β)(1 + β)2 .
Now for the initial condition n on Γ, we have n2−n1 = X = F (X), n2 = n3, and n1+n2+n3 =
(1+β). Hence n1 =
−2X+1+β
3 . Note that on the line Z
A
1,3 in ΣB (see Figure 9 in the main text) one
35
has (in pB coordinates) QB1,3 =
1
1+β (β, 1+ β
2, β), EB = 1+β3 (1, 1, 1) and R
B
1,3 =
1
2−β (1, β− β2, 1)
(and symmetrically for other points). During the third of the orbit studied we have that we
travel first along [RB23, E
B] until meeting EB and then along [EB , RB13]. The proportion
|EB23 − fB23|
|QB23 − fB23|
is therefore, (by doing the computations in the pB-simplex)
1+β
3 − n1
1+β2
1+β − n1
=
1+β
3 − −2X+1+β3
1+β2
1+β − −2X+1+β3
=
β2 + β − 1
2β + 1
.
So when β is equal to the golden mean then this is equal to 0 and it increases monotonically
when β ∈ [σ, 1) (its maximum is 1/3). Similarly,
|fB23 − EB23|
|RB23 − EB23|
=
1+β
3 − n1
1+β
3 − β−β
2
2−β
=
1+β
3 − −2X+1+β3
1+β
3 − β−β
2
2−β
=
β2 + β − 1
(1 + β)2
(which again increases in β).
Note that when β 6= σ, the time taken for a trajectory on J to spiral into or out of the interior
equilibrium E is finite. This is because for small X we have that F (X) = c1(β)X +O(X
2) and
that the time taken for this step is t1 + t2 = c2(β)X + O(X
2) for some constants c1(β), c2(β)
depending on β. When c1(β) 6= 1, which is true precisely when β 6= σ, this gives geometric
(rather than exponential) convergence towards or divergence away from E. This phenomenon is
intimately connected with the fact that the flow does not extend in a continuous way to E; there
is genuine non-uniqueness of the flow at E (since trajectories may remain at E for all positive
and negative time, or may leave it at some moment in positive time (β > σ) or in negative time
(β < σ). When β = σ the time taken for trajectories to tend to E is infinite, as can easily be
checked.
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